Michigan Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 1

1957

Partnerships - Partnership by Estoppel - Proof of Reliance by
Creditor Dealing With Persons in Belief of Partnership
Allen Dewey
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allen Dewey, Partnerships - Partnership by Estoppel - Proof of Reliance by Creditor Dealing With Persons
in Belief of Partnership, 56 MICH. L. REV. 139 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/15

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

139

PARTNERSHIPS-PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL-PROOF OF RELIANC!: BY CREDITOR DEALING WITH PERSONS IN BELIEF OF PARTNERSHIP-Plaintiff telephone company sued to collect for local and long distance telephone service rendered through telephone number 196W. Defendant Walter R.
Lehmann denied liability on the ground that the service was not furnished
to him but to his son, Wayne R. Lehmann. The telephone was located in
Wayne's business headquarters, a building on defendant's farm, over which
hung a sign "W. R. Lehmann & Son-Dairy Cattle." Plaintiff carried the
telephone in Wayne's .name for fifteen months, until, at Wayne's request,
the listing was changed to W.R. Lehmann & Son. The change was made
for the 1953 and 1954 directories, and monthly bills were then mailed to
W. R. Lehmann & Son. All bills for the first eighteen months after the
new listing were paid by checks signed by Wayne or his wife. Plaintiff's
employees believed defendant and Wayne were partners, although in fact
they were not. The jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed.
Even if it be assumed that defendant was responsible for the misleading
appearances, plaintiff had not made out a case of partnership by estoppel
under section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act,1 since it had not shown
that it gave credit to defendant's. son only in reliance upon the alleged
partnership. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Lehmann, (Wis. 1957) 80 N.W.
(2d) 267.
The principal case illustrates the difficulties that may arise when a
creditor seeks to hold a person liable as a partner by estoppel when the
creditor has previously extended credit to the recipient of goods or services
as an individual rather than as a partner of the person sought to be helq.
liable. The difficulty lies in proving that the credit was given "on the

1 "When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or
consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership
or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is· liable to any such person to whom
such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation, given
credit to the actual or apparent partnership. . •." Wis. Stat. (1953) §123.13. ·
'
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faith of such representation"2 of a partnership. In the more typical case
where there are no dealings prior to the transaction sued upon, the courts
require only that the creditor show he believed there was a partnership
and extended credit in the partnership name.3 The Wisconsin court in
the principal case and at least two other courts4 have, however, applied
a more stringent test of reliance where such prior dealings were present.
The test, as given in the principal case, is a "but-for" causal one: but for
the alleged partnership with the defendant, would the creditor have furnished goods or services to the recipient as an individual? If so, then he
cannot be said to have relied to his detriment upon defendant's misrepresentations of partnership and he cannot hold defendant liable by
estoppel. The apparent theory underlying this test is that prior extension
of credit to the recipient5 tends to negate the othenvise reasonable assumption that the creditor relied equally upon the financial status of all members of ·the alleged partnership. The test limits partnership by estoppel,
as a theory of recovery after earlier dealings with the recipient, to cases
in which the creditor can show a refusal, prior to the transaction in question, to continue to extend credit to the recipient as an individual. Possible
bases for a refusal include, e.g., (1) a tightening of the credit policies of
plaintiff, (2) previously unknown information concerning the recipient's
2 Uniform Partnership Act, §16. Prior to the Uniform Partnership Act, there were
two views of the test of liability where defendant did not himself make the misrepresentations. The minority view held one liable if he knew he was being held out as a partner
but took no action to prevent the holding out. See Fletcher v. Pullen & Anderson, 70 Md.
205, 16 A. 887 (1889). The majority view was that defendant must in fact have consented
to the holding out or he was not liable. The Uniform Partnership Act was intended
to adopt the majority view. Lewis, "The Uniform Partnership Act," 24 YALE L. J. 617
(1915). It may be questioned whether it has been accepted as changing the law in Maryland, however. See McBriety v. Phillips, 180 Md. 569 at 578, 26 A. (2d) 400 (1942), where
the Fletcher case is cited with apparent approval. See also 3 Mn. L. REv. 189 (1939).
Which view is followed in Wisconsin is not ascertainable as the court in the principal
case, apparently the first in this state to consider §16 of the act, refused to pass on
the issue. The only Wisconsin case involving partnership :by estoppel which reached the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin prior to the act· was Jenkins v. Davis, 54 Wis. 253, 11
N.W. 548 (1882), in which the defendant himself made the misrepresentations so that
this issue did not arise.
3Flock v. Wpliams, 175 Ill. App. 319 (1912); Look v. Watson & Sons, 117 Me. 476,
104 A. 850 (1918); McBriety v. Phillips, note I supra; Bissell v. Warde, 129 Mo. 439,
31 S.W. 928 (1895); Friday v. Rowen & Barton, Ill Ore. 7, 224 P. 632 (1924); C.A.
Babcock Co. v. Katz, 121 Ore. 64, 253 P. 373 (1927). GILMORE, PARTNERSHIPS 67 (1911):
" ••• [I]t is not necessary for him to show that he relied solely on the credit of the
defendant. It is sufficient to charge the defendant if he gave credit to a firm of which
he believed him to be a partner." The above cases were decided prior to the enactment
of the UPA in the respective jurisdictions, but there are no later cases to impugn their
authority.
4 Elliott v. Floyd, 85 Ga. App. 416, 69 S.E. (2d) 620 (1952) and Yarbrough v.
Donoghue, Dee & Co., 134 Miss. 578, 99 S. 380 (1924). These were the only other cases
found by the writer where the opinion revealed there was a record of prior dealings.
Neither of these cases was decided under the Uniform Partnership Act.
5 A record of prior dealings with defendant as an individual will, of course, strengthen plaintiff's assertion of reliance. See Woodward, Faxon & Co. v. Clark, 30 Kan. 78,
2-- P. 106 (1883).
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credit rating, or (3) a reversal in the recipient's financial position. This
test of reliance has the merit of requiring the creditor to show he gave
some weight to the misrepresentations before he may hold another liable
for them. It should be noted that it is not altogether clear that the Wisconsin court intended to restrict this rigorous test of reliance to cases
involving prior dealings, although this seems the more reasonable interpretation. The ambiguity is heightened by the fact that in the prior leading Wisconsin decision6 on partnership by estoppel, although the court
made no discussion of reliance as a necessary element, it noted that plaintiffs had testified that they would not have sold to the recipient alone as he
was irresponsible.7 It is submitted that the doctrine enunciated in the
principal case should not be extended beyond those cases in which the
recipient has p:r:eviously been extended credit as an individual. To require
a creditor to show in every case that the recipient's financial standing did
not warrant extension of credit to him as an individual would greatly
reduce the effectiveness of the partnership by estoppel doctrine as a means
of preventing injustice and allow many defendants to escape liability when
traditionally they would have been held for their misrepresentations.

Allen Dewey, S. Ed.

6 Jenkins v. Davis, note 2
7 "The plaintiffs testified

supra.
positively that they sold the property to and solely on
the credit of the firm, and that they would not have sold it to Crane alone, because
he was irresponsible." Jenkins v. Davis, note 2 supra, at 256.

